How the cost of entry rises
A curve set in advance, then a rate the holders choose. Both are ceilings.
In Phase 1 the mint price is defined analytically and depends solely on the number of tokens already issued, running from $0.001 for the first token to $200 for the hundred-millionth. The count covers every token ever created; redemption does not reduce it, so the mint price does not fall under any outflow of participants.
Phase 1 need not run to the hundred-millionth token. From the completion of stage 3 the holders may vote, in any cycle, to end Phase 1 early and move to Phase 2 — the protocol’s main route. Waiting for the curve to be exhausted is not required.
In Phase 2 the mint price becomes a function of time and is recomputed continuously, in accordance with the prevailing growth rate. The rate takes values from a fixed ladder: 5.6, 9, 14.5, 23.6, 38.2, 50, 61.8, 100 and 161.8 per cent a year. The minimum never becomes negative.
How it behaves
Computed from the formula in the white paper: an envelope on a logarithmic scale rising at a rate proportional to 1 + 0.8·cos(2πx), with a cycloid inside each of the ten stages. Stage endpoints match the white paper’s table.
The ten stages of Phase 1
| Stage | Tokens | Price at the end | Shape |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 0–10 M | $0.0084 | convex downward |
| 2 | 10–20 M | $0.050 | convex downward |
| 3 | 20–30 M | $0.171 | convex downward |
| 4 | 30–40 M | $0.329 | convex downward |
| 5 | 40–50 M | $0.447 | convex downward |
| 6 | 50–60 M | $0.608 | convex upward |
| 7 | 60–70 M | $1.17 | convex upward |
| 8 | 70–80 M | $3.97 | convex upward |
| 9 | 80–90 M | $23.7 | convex upward |
| 10 | 90–100 M | $200.0 | convex upward |
The ladder of growth rates in Phase 2
Nine rungs, per cent a year. The regulator steps through them one probe per cycle; in manual mode the holders set the rung by vote. The minimum never becomes negative.
Who moves the rate in Phase 2
How the regulator moves the rung — on the governance page, with an interactive.
Which rung is in force is decided in one of two modes. In automatic mode the rung is moved by the regulator. The regulator is not a body, an office or a person: it is a rule written into the contract. It watches a single indicator — the inflow of collateral into new positions over each cycle of about forty-one days — and does nothing while the inflow stays within its usual variation. When the inflow falls by more than that, the rule steps through the ladder from the current rung, one probe per cycle, until it finds a rate at which inflow resumes.
In manual mode the regulator is switched off and the holders set the rate directly by vote, the median of the votes prevailing. The choice of mode is itself a vote, open in every cycle, and switching is reversible. One exception: if the regulator has tried every rung and inflow has not recovered, the contract sets the lowest rate and passes control to the holders — a finding, not a fault.
Both figures — two hundred dollars and 161.8 per cent a year — are ceilings on the cost of entry, not a return. They describe how fast entry into the protocol may grow dearer, and say nothing about what a holder will receive. The figure that actually applies depends on the behaviour of the system as a whole and on what the community votes for.
The formula is disclosed in full and deliberately so: the mint price is computed by the contract and is reproducible from the bytecode in any event. Concealing it would protect nothing while depriving a participant of the ability to verify what they pay before transacting.