ASTRX
1DefinitionSee also →
Assetrix is a protocol for issuing a collateralised token whose creation price rises monotonically and never falls. External assets are placed into a wrapper, entry into which becomes more expensive with every token issued.
The founders regard this as a distinct class of crypto asset, which may be termed a ratchet — a coin with a rising issuance price. The definition refers solely to the price of creating new tokens, which is set by the protocol and does not decline. The market price of ASTRX has no bearing on the definition: it is determined by demand, sits within a corridor between backing and the cost of entry, and may fall.
The class is conceived as a complement to the stablecoin. A stablecoin holds its face value and with it loses purchasing power; here the entry price is tied to a rising quantity, while the collateral remains real and reclaimable at any time.
2Position and tokenSee also →
A participant deposits collateral and receives a position — a non-fungible token holding its own collateral. The position may be redeemed at face value, or closed, which issues transferable ASTRX tokens backed by a share of the shared pool.
A position entails no nominal loss under any circumstances: the deposited collateral is returned in full, and the cost of holding it is the opportunity cost of capital rather than the risk of loss. A token carries market risk: its price may fall towards the lower boundary of the corridor. The position is for saving without market risk; the token is for paying and trading.
The protocol is non-custodial. Collateral is held in the smart contract and may be reclaimed by its owner at any time. Collateral is exogenous — the backing consists of external assets rather than the protocol’s own token, so no mechanism for self-destruction of the reserve exists. In this the design differs fundamentally from algorithmic ones.
3The price corridorSee also →
The protocol does not set the market price of ASTRX and cannot set it. It sets two other figures, and the market price lies between them.
Below sits the backing — the share of the reserve that falls to one token. This level is held up by redemption, which is open at all times: a holder exchanges tokens for a proportional share of the reserve, less the redemption fee, whenever he likes. This is not an undertaking to buy the token back at some price, but a consequence of the design — the reserve belongs to the holders, and the way out of it does not close under any circumstance.
Above sits the cost of entry — the price at which the contract mints a new token. Anyone may enter at any time at that price, so there is no reason to pay substantially more on the market than entry costs.
4How the cost of entry risesSee also →
In Phase 1 the mint price is defined analytically and depends solely on the number of tokens already issued, running from $0.001 for the first token to $200 for the hundred-millionth. The count covers every token ever created; redemption does not reduce it, so the mint price does not fall under any outflow of participants.
Phase 1 need not run to the hundred-millionth token. From the completion of stage 3 the holders may vote, in any cycle, to end Phase 1 early and move to Phase 2 — the protocol’s main route. Waiting for the curve to be exhausted is not required.
In Phase 2 the mint price becomes a function of time and is recomputed continuously, in accordance with the prevailing growth rate. The rate takes values from a fixed ladder: 5.6, 9, 14.5, 23.6, 38.2, 50, 61.8, 100 and 161.8 per cent a year. The minimum never becomes negative.
5Protection of backingSee also →
- Redemption is neutral — A holder who redeems takes exactly his proportional share of the reserve. The pool shrinks; the backing of those who remain does not. A collapse of backing through exit is impossible by construction.
- The protection level — Backing per token is not permitted to fall by more than a set share of its historical maximum. The admissible drawdown is 61.8 per cent by default — the most lenient rung, catastrophe protection only — and the holders can tighten it by vote down to 50, 38.2 and 23.6 per cent. A closing that would dilute the pool may use at most 38.2 per cent of the headroom above the threshold, so the remainder shrinks geometrically and the threshold is approached but never breached. No sequence of operations, no number of addresses and no splitting of positions changes this.
- Closings that raise the floor — When a position created at a high mint price is closed, its collateral joins the pool at a price above the current backing, and backing per token rises for everyone. This is the principal channel of growth. Such a closing is never charged a fee — the rule is outside the reach of any vote.
- Fees that flow to the holders — The dilution fee on a closing that would lower backing is withheld in tokens that never enter circulation. The transfer fee and every token burned to cast a vote leave the supply while their collateral stays in the pool. The redemption fee stays in the reserve. These channels are strongest precisely when participants are leaving.
- The redemption multiplier — The redemption fee is multiplied by a factor that grows with the drawdown of backing from its historical maximum — 1 at no drawdown, 1.618 at 38.2 per cent, 2.618 at 61.8. The factor is continuous, so there is never a moment before which it pays to hurry out, and it returns to one by itself as backing recovers.
- Surcharges on volatile collateral — A deposit in a volatile currency pays a spread, and a further surcharge when that currency’s share of the reserve is high. Both enter the pool without creating new tokens, so they raise backing for everyone.
- Rounding — Every rounding in every operation goes the way that is safe for the reserve.
6GovernanceSee also →
The protocol’s parameters are governed by holders themselves. A vote is cast by burning tokens; their collateral stays in the pool and works for everyone who remains. No protocol role can alter the governed values against holders’ will, admit a collateral currency contrary to their decision, or halt the return of funds to participants.
7What the protocol does not doSee also →
- No yield — Nothing is paid out of nothing. There is no interest, no reward for holding, no distribution. What rises by the rules is the cost of entry, not what a holder receives.
- No promise about the market price — The protocol does not guarantee, support or target the market price of ASTRX. It sets the two boundaries of the corridor and leaves the rest to the market. The price can fall.
- No buy-back — The protocol does not undertake to buy tokens back at any particular price. Redemption at the reserve’s proportional share is a property of the design, not a purchase.
- No protection of volatile collateral — Where the reserve holds volatile currencies, their fall lowers the floor. The contract softens this and does not remove it.
- No forecast — Everything on this site describes intent and mechanics. The market’s actual behaviour depends on circumstances beyond the protocol’s control.
- No custody — Collateral is held in the contract, never by a person or a company. No one can move it except its owner, and no one can stop its owner from reclaiming it.
8Glossary
- ratchet
- A class of crypto asset whose issuance price rises monotonically and never falls. Refers to the mint price only.
- mint price / cost of entry
- The price at which the contract creates a new token for a deposit of collateral. Set by the contract; never decreases.
- backing per token
- The share of the reserve that falls to one circulating token. The lower boundary of the corridor.
- corridor
- The space between backing per token and the cost of entry, inside which the market price sits and may fall.
- position
- A non-fungible token holding its own collateral at its own entry price. Redeemable at face value; can be closed or split.
- closing
- Converting a position into circulating ASTRX. Never charged a fee.
- redemption
- Exchanging ASTRX for a proportional share of the reserve, less the redemption fee. Always open.
- protection level
- The admissible drawdown of backing from its historical maximum: 61.8 % by default, tightened by vote to 50, 38.2 or 23.6.
- headroom
- Backing present in the pool above the minimum needed to hold the threshold. A dilutive closing may use at most 38.2 % of it.
- redemption multiplier
- A factor on the redemption fee equal to 1 ÷ (1 − drawdown). Continuous; returns to one as backing recovers.
- regulator
- A rule in the contract that moves the Phase 2 growth rate through the ladder according to inflow, one probe per cycle.
- cycle
- The governance period of about forty-one days in which votes are counted and the regulator acts.
- voting credits
- Credits earned by closing positions, usable in votes; non-transferable and destroyed on token transfer.
- issuance count
- The cumulative number of tokens ever created. Drives the Phase 1 mint price; never decreases.